AbstractsPhilosophy & Theology

Burqa Ban, Freedom of Religion and ‘Living Together’

by Sune Lægaard




Institution: Roskilde University
Department:
Year: 2015
Keywords: menneskerettigheder; Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol; religionsfrihed; burka; skønsmargin; Human Rights; European Court of Human Rights; Freedom of Religion; burqa; Margin of appreciation
Record ID: 1120959
Full text PDF: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-015-0362-6;


http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/23154


Abstract

In the summer of 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the French 2010 law banning face-covering clothing in public spaces, the so-called burqa ban, did not violate the right to freedom of religion. Due to the ‘wide margin of appreciation’, the Court deemed the ban proportionate to the French state’s legitimate aim with the ban of preserving the conditions of ‘living together’. The paper analyses and provides an internal criticism of the Court’s justification for this judgement focusing on the aim of living together and the right to freedom of religion. The Court’s justification presupposes that (a) there is a justification for the ban in terms of the aim of living together, (b) this is a legitimate aim and (c) the ban is a proportional means of pursuing this aim. The paper analyses the Court’s justification and argues that it fails to substantiate all three conditions.; In the summer of 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the French 2010 law banning face-covering clothing in public spaces, the so-called burqa ban, did not violate the right to freedom of religion. Due to the ‘wide margin of appreciation’, the Court deemed the ban proportionate to the French state’s legitimate aim with the ban of preserving the conditions of ‘living together’. The paper analyses and provides an internal criticism of the Court’s justification for this judgement focusing on the aim of living together and the right to freedom of religion. The Court’s justification presupposes that (a) there is a justification for the ban in terms of the aim of living together, (b) this is a legitimate aim and (c) the ban is a proportional means of pursuing this aim. The paper analyses the Court’s justification and argues that it fails to substantiate all three conditions.