|Institution:||University of Oslo|
|Full text PDF:||http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-29605
The study of ethnic mobilization is often equated with ethnic conflict. However, mobilization comes in many forms, both violent and non-violent. Accordingly, we must seek to understand both these dynamics so that we may determine factors conducive to mass killings and civil conflict. In this thesis, I develop a framework of ethnic mobilization where ethnic publics are held to be instigated by economic horizontal inequalities while their elites mobilize as a result of political horizontal inequalities. As such, I argue that publics cannot escalate a mobilization to the level of civil war because of coordination problems while elites are dependant on the manpower provided by the public. In sum, this makes for a dynamic between the two levels that entails a mutual dependence. Accordingly, I hypothesize non-violent mobilization to ensue as a consequence of economic horizontal inequalities while political horizontal inequalities and the dual materialization of both spur violent conflict. By applying two quantitative models, these dynamics are investigated. Interestingly, economic horizontal inequality has a significant effect on both violent and non-violent mobilization while political horizontal inequalities, as expected, only affects violent mobilization. The effect of their dual materialization is more ambiguous, however, but the data does indicate the elite-public dynamic set forth by the framework.