AbstractsPhilosophy & Theology

The most general charge laid against Kant for many years was that of inconsistency. The aim of this thesis is to show that some of the greatest difficulties in Kant’s Ethics are due to his attempt to be too consistent - to his attempt to expound his moral theory in the metaphysical terms of the First Critique. That this attempt fails and that, nevertheless, the greater part of Kant’s moral philosophy is not thereby invalidated, is proof of the worth and strength of the latter. How far grounds for the rejection of Kant’s metaphysical system are provided by the incompatibility of this system with the most important field of man’s experience, is not here discussed. It must however be emphasised that far from Kant’s moral theory being dependent on the existence or reality of certain metaphysical entities, as some have argued - for example, G. E. Moore in “Principia Ethica” - Kant’s very attempt to establish the reality of his metaphysical world on moral grounds is one which can only be held a failure. But it is a failure to be contrasted with the success of his analysis of moral obligation and the authority of the moral imperative, which analysis does not require the phenomenal-noumenal distinction according to this thesis.[...]