The philosophy of Kant is undoubtedly one of the most stubborn and daring attempts of the mundane mind to furnish a true account of its own knowledge. This philosophy, both on account of its teachings and through its historical development, has been closely allied to idealism. Fichte, for example, who was Kant's own pupil, in spite of the protests of his master, was the first to turn it into a form of idealism, while men like Paulsen, Royce, and Perry, have classed Kant amongst idealists. And when we add to this Kant's own classification of his philosophy as critical idealism, it would seem that transcendentalism is idealism were it not, on the one hand, that Herbart and his followers have quite as well given to it a realistic interpretation, while, on the other hand, Kant himself classifies transcendental idealism as coequal with empirical realism or dualism. At the present time, when so many writings, both books and magazine articles, appear which defend or oppose the position that Kant's philosophy is idealistic, it would seem that an attempt on the part of a student of philosophy to investigate for himself this point should be highly profitable. It is with this in mind that we have undertaken the present paper, using Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" for reference, a. book of which he says: "There ought not to be a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not been furnished."