Abstracts Law

Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: The Second Lebanon War

by Miriam Ganem-Rosen

This paper asks whether Israel’s strategy of deterrence through disproportionate retaliation is effective in its asymmetrical conflicts against non-state actors. It begins with an analysis of the Israeli strategy of deterrence and retaliation methods against non-state actors, surveying the application of deterrence and retaliation strategies from 1948 through the 1982 Lebanon War. It culminates in an analysis of Israeli involvement in Lebanon, the rise of Hezbollah, and the Second Lebanon War of 2006. The paper finds that Israel has developed an overreliance on military force, which leads it to use it excessively in situations where it is ineffective, such as in asymmetrical conflict. It concludes that not only does the use of excessive force in asymmetrical conflict fail to affect the motivation or capabilities of the non-state adversary which would enforce Israeli deterrence, but it also creates humanitarian catastrophes, which in turn bring about diplomatic isolation and the delegitimization of Israel’s struggle against terrorism.