AbstractsBiology & Animal Science

The subject of the present work is the currently fashionable,scientific view of reality, which Ishall denominate reductive materialism.Accordingto this metaphysical theory,the only ontologically real objects are the micro-particles describedby physics;the macro-objects of or­dinary experience,such as organisms,artifacts,andnatural things,are nothingmore than collec­tions of these interactingmicro-particles. Reductive materialism is a metaphysical theory about what exists,about what shouldbe includedin an ontological inventory of real things.In discussingthis theory,Iprovide a concep­tual analysis of ontological reduction,showingwhat it means to say that an upper-level object is ”nothingmore than‘a collection of interactingconstituent particles,andIargue that the reduci­bility of upper-level objects to their constituent particles determines whether the laws andtheo­ries of the special sciences can in principle be reducedto the laws andtheories of physics and chemistry.Thus,the critical question in the debates between reductionists andanti-reductionists is the nature of the objects of experience.Are these upper-level objects real things? In chapter one,Iintroduce andexamine general epistemological issues in belief forma­tion andevaluation.In chapter two,Idiscuss ontological reductionism,anda materialist lterna-tive,ontological emergentism,accordingto which the interaction of material particles can,in some instances,inexplicably give rise to novel ontological objects.Ievaluate sixobjections to the possibility of ontological mergence,andconclude that it remains a viable metaphysical posi­tion.In chapter three,Iconsider scientific reductionism.Iargue that several well-known argu­ments against the reduction of scientific theories are unsuccessful,andthat ontological reduc­tionism actually entails scientific reductionism.In chapter four,Itake up the ”gene‘s eye‘view of nature,championedby RichardDawkins,which attempts to reduce organisms to a competi­tion amongtheir genes.Iargue that the reduction fails.Andfinally,in chapter five,Iconclude that objections to reductive materialism ultimately springfrom its denial of the reality of upper-level objects.Therefore,the problem confrontingthe anti-reductionist is to supply a metaphysi­cal theory in which upper-level objects can findtheir reality.