Abstracts Category : Other

A naval history of interwar naval arms control

by David Chessum

The attempt by the major powers between 1918 and 1939 to negotiate naval limitation was an unparalleled experiment in the management of global military power and a significant feature of the interwar diplomatic landscape. Naval arms control dominated the naval policies, strategies, and programmes of the major naval powers and, by controlling the types, quantities and designs of the warships available at the start of the Second World War, shaped the maritime warfare environment at a critical period in history. The interwar naval arms control process represents the most extensive historical case study of conventional arms control available for analysis. Although there has been extensive research on various aspects of interwar naval arms control, literature by political historians has generally failed to address the detailed technical nature of this topic and contains a number of errors, which has impacted the lessons learned from the process. Naval historical literature, on the other hand, has treated naval arms control anecdotally or tangentially, if at all. There has therefore been a need for an historical account that corrects the historical record and integrates detailed research into the naval aspects of the negotiations. This thesis uses a historical methodology drawing primarily on archival sources to establish a thorough historical record of interwar naval arms control from the perspective of a naval historian. In developing a record more thorough than any previous study, it corrects both factual errors, and notable errors of omission, in the existing knowledge of the topic and provides a basis on which to re-evaluate the lessons learned.The thesis concludes that qualitative naval limitation was easier to negotiate than quantitative because it generally did not materially impact on a nations ability to defend itself, or on matters of national pride or prestige. It was possible to generate win-win agreements that provided economic benefits to all parties, prevented qualitative competition, and promoted stability. Quantitative limitation was more complex, and was only really practicable when there was a genuine lack of hostility, and no real desire for competition between the parties.Advisors/Committee Members: Scott, Shirley, Politics & International Relations, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, UNSW.